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UPDATES FROM THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
afriCan regional &  
SuB-regional SyStemS
coLLective RigHts But no 
inDePenDence foR soutHeRn 
cameRoons
On May 27, 2009, the African Com-
mission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
declared Southern Cameroonians “a peo-
ple.” Nearly eight months later, the deci-
sion remains a topic of vigorous public 
debate in Cameroon. The recognition of 
Southern Cameroonians as a people culmi-
nated a six-year legal battle initiated by a 
complaint filed on behalf of the people of 
Southern Cameroons against the Republic 
of Cameroon. The complainants asserted 
that the Republic of Cameroon is illegally 
occupying the Southern Cameroons in vio-
lation of Article 20 of the African Char-
ter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. For 
the Southern Cameroonian independence 
movement, this decision represents only 
partial success. As a recognized people, 
Southern Cameroonians can now assert 
collective rights under the African Charter. 
However, the Commission stopped short 
of the complainants’ ultimate goal, instead 
upholding a high threshold for a people to 
be able to exercise the right to self-deter-
mination through secession where doing 
so challenges the territorial integrity of a 
state.
As the Commission explained, “a peo-
ple” is a group that shares “a common 
historical tradition, a racial or ethnic iden-
tity, cultural homogeneity, linguistic unity, 
religious and ideological affinities, territo-
rial connection, and a common economic 
life.” The people of Southern Cameroons 
contend that their history of British colo-
nial occupation differentiates them from 
the majority population of the Republic of 
Cameroon and defines their present-day 
identity. While Southern Cameroonians 
speak English and follow the common law 
system, most people of the Republic of 
Cameroon speak French and ascribe to the 
civil law system.
In their initial filing, the complainants 
asserted that recognition of a group as 
“a people” under the Charter entitles the 
group to collective rights. They contended 
that all peoples have a right to secession by 
means of self-determination under Article 
20(1) of the Charter, which states:
All peoples shall have the right 
to existence. They shall have the 
unquestionable right to self-determi-
nation. They shall freely determine 
their political status, and shall pursue 
their economic and social develop-
ment according to the policy they 
have freely chosen.
However, according to the Commis-
sion, the right to self-determination is not 
absolute. Meeting the requirements to be 
recognized as a people “cannot be used 
as the only determinant factor to accord 
or deny the enjoyment or protection of 
peoples’ rights.”
To determine whether the African Char-
ter permits Southern Cameroons to secede 
from the Republic of Cameroon, the Com-
mission relied on precedent established 
in Katangese Peoples Congress v. Zaire, 
which it decided in 1995. In Katangese 
Peoples Congress, a liberation movement 
from the Katanga region of what was then 
Zaire filed a claim for independence based 
on Article 20(1) of the Charter. The Com-
mission held that the Charter only recog-
nizes a legal basis for self-determination in 
circumstances of either massive violations 
of human rights or prohibition of a peoples’ 
participation in public affairs. Applying the 
test from Katangese Peoples Congress to 
the case of Southern Cameroons, the Com-
mission found that, even though multiple 
individual rights of Southern Cameroo-
nians were violated, the Republic of Cam-
eroon neither committed massive human 
rights violations nor completely barred 
Southern Cameroonians from participating 
in governance and public affairs.
Consequently, the Commission’s rec-
ognition of Southern Cameroonians as a 
people likely provides few, if any, addi-
tional rights or privileges to the people of 
the Southern Cameroons. However, the 
Commission’s recognition of the Southern 
Cameroonians as a people may strengthen 
their case for greater political autonomy 
within the Republic of Cameroon.
afRican couRt’s fiRst JuDgment 
sHowcases JuRisDictionaL Limits
In its historic first judgment, rendered 
on December 15, 2009, judges of the 
African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights voted unanimously to dismiss a case 
for lack of jurisdiction. The complainant, 
Michelot Yogogombaye, had requested that 
the Court suspend ongoing proceedings 
initiated by Senegal against former Chad-
ian dictator Hissène Habré, who has lived 
in exile in Senegal since being deposed in 
1990. Habré is alleged to be responsible for 
200,000 cases of torture and 40,000 politi-
cally motivated murders committed during 
his presidency. The ruling highlights an 
immense obstacle in the way of the Court’s 
jurisdiction over complaints filed by indi-
viduals or NGOs against an African state: 
the respondent state must have first given 
its consent.
The complaint alleged that the case 
against Habré is politically motivated, cit-
ing the 2008 amendment of the Senega-
lese Constitution that permits retroactive 
application of Senegalese criminal law, 
the result of international pressure to pros-
ecute Habré. Yogogombaye claimed the 
amendment violates both the Senegalese 
Constitution and Article 7(2) of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
requiring that “no penalty may be inflicted 
for an offence for which no provision was 
made at the time it was committed.”
In response, Senegal moved to dis-
miss Yogogombaye’s complaint for lack 
of jurisdiction. Senegal argued that before 
individuals can file complaints before the 
Court, “the respondent State must first 
have recognized the jurisdiction of the 
Court to receive such applications in accor-
dance with Article 34(6) of the Protocol 
establishing the Court.”
Yogogombaye contended that, because 
Senegal is a member of the African Union, 
which promulgated the Protocol, Senegal 
has de facto “made the declaration pre-
scribed in Article 34(6) accepting the com-
petence of the Court to receive applications 
submitted by individuals.”
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In finding for Senegal, the Court 
affirmed that Article 34(6) makes direct 
access to the Court contingent on a prior 
“special declaration” by the respondent 
state authorizing cases to be brought 
against it by individuals. Because Senegal 
has made no such declaration, the Court 
dismissed Yogogombaye’s complaint for 
lack of jurisdiction.
At present, the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples Rights provides the 
only other avenue available to individuals 
and NGOs intent on filing a claim before 
the Court against a state that has not 
made a special declaration. Establishing 
a relationship similar to that of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights 
and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, Article 5 of the Protocol grants the 
Commission authority to refer cases to the 
Court. It is as yet unclear what criteria the 
Commission will use to determine whether 
to refer a case to the Court.
In light of the horrific crimes car-
ried out under Habré’s regime, the Court’s 
dismissal of Yogogombaye’s complaint 
may seem comforting. However, the Court 
could just as easily dismiss a case in which 
the complainant is a victim of state abuses. 
What then will convince African states to 
offer their own victims the possibility of 
filing a direct complaint before the Court?
As is evidenced by the fact that Burkina 
Faso and Mali are the only two states that 
have filed the special declaration, African 
states are not eager to increase their expo-
sure to potential complaints. Consequently, 
Yogogombaye lays bare one great obstacle 
to accessing the new Court. For the Court 
to fulfill its objective of “promotion and 
protection of Human and Peoples’ Rights,” 
citizens and non-state actors must advocate 
for Article 34(6) declarations from their 
governments.
comPLiance witH existing 
manDate must come BefoRe waR 
cRimes tRiaLs at afRican couRt 
on Human anD PeoPLes’ RigHts
“Extending the jurisdiction of the Afri-
can Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
to cover international crimes would under-
mine justice and accountability on the 
continent,” asserted a coalition of eight 
prominent international human rights 
groups in an expert opinion published 
December 17, 2009. The statement came 
in response to a February 2009 decision 
made by the Assembly of the African 
Union (AU) during its 12th Ordinary Ses-
sion. The decision pertained to a perceived 
abuse of the principle of universal jurisdic-
tion, a repeated topic of concern within the 
Assembly.
On this occasion, the Assembly’s objec-
tion pertained to France’s November 2008 
arrest of Rose Kabuye, the Chief of Proto-
col to the President of Rwanda and former 
officer in the Rwandan Patriotic Front, for 
her alleged involvement in the assassina-
tion of former Rwandan President Juvenal 
Habyarimana. The Assembly criticized the 
arrest and formally requested the AU Com-
mission “to examine the implications of 
the Court being empowered to try inter-
national crimes such as genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes.”
However, as the authors of the expert 
opinion assert, any extension of the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the Court must be 
“compatible with the United Nations Char-
ter and, by implication, the Rome Statute 
of the ICC.” Meeting this standard could 
be difficult.
In addition to needing increased finan-
cial and diplomatic resources to support 
the expertise needed for an expanded juris-
diction, the Court would also require AU 
Member States to strengthen norms of 
compliance and cooperation. The current 
low rate of compliance with decisions of 
the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights suggests that adherence to 
decisions by the Court in contentious crim-
inal cases would not be easily achieved. 
Consequently, contrary to AU Member 
States’ obligation under Article 4 of the AU 
Constitutive Act to fight impunity, enlarg-
ing the jurisdiction of the Court could even 
widen the impunity gap for individuals 
responsible for egregious crimes.
Expanding the jurisdiction of the Court 
is not the only means of bolstering the 
credibility of the African regional human 
rights system. Improving compliance and 
cooperation within the current legal frame-
work could also minimize the frequency 
with which foreign courts invoke uni-
versal jurisdiction over African nationals. 
Additionally, as the largest regional group 
within the Assembly of States Parties to 
the Rome Statute of the ICC, AU Member 
States could enhance their engagement 
and thereby exert greater influence within 
the ICC. Therefore, in anticipation of the 
Commission’s review of the Court’s juris-
diction, AU Member States must prioritize 
compliance with the existing mandate of 
the Court.
Andrew W. Maki, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, covers the 
African regional and sub-regional courts 
for the Human Rights Brief.
european Court of  
human rightS
etHnicity ReQuiRements foR 
canDiDates: Human RigHts 
vioLation oR Peace PRomotion?
Provisions of the Bosnian and Herze-
govinian constitution restricting the ability 
to run for the Presidency or the House of 
Peoples to the three “constituent peoples,” 
Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats, violates the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 
the European Court of Human Rights held 
on December 22, 2009. In Sedjic´  and Finci 
v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, two otherwise 
qualified Bosnian and Herzegovinian citi-
zens, one Jewish and the other Roma, were 
deemed ineligible to run for the Presidency 
and the House of Peoples, solely because 
of their ethnicity. The Court determined 
that the contested constitutional provisions 
violate several Convention provisions, 
including Article 14, the prohibition of 
discrimination, together with Protocol No. 
1 Article 3, the right to free elections, and 
Protocol No. 12 Article 1, the general pro-
hibition of discrimination.
Annexed to the 1995 Dayton Peace 
Accords, which ended the ethnic conflict, 
the Bosnian and Herzegovinian constitu-
tion distinguishes between two catego-
ries of citizens: “constituent peoples” and 
“others.” The Constitution requires that 
the House of Peoples be composed of 15 
members, equally divided among each of 
the three constituent groups. One member 
of each group comprises the three-member 
rotating Presidency. Individuals who do not 
identify themselves as Bosniacs, Croats, or 
Serbs, like the applicants in this case, are 
forbidden from running for these offices.
At the time of the Constitution’s enact-
ment, mandating equal representation of 
the warring groups in the Presidency and 
the upper parliamentary house promoted 
the peace-keeping aims of the Dayton 
Peace Accords. The Court reasoned, how-
ever, that because the extreme ethnic 
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tension between these three groups has 
considerably stabilized in recent years, 
such limitations are no longer necessary.
While acknowledging that a complete 
abandonment of the power-sharing mecha-
nisms may not be suitable at this time, the 
Court proposed that Bosnia and Herze-
govina could replace the discriminatory 
provisions with “mechanisms of power-
sharing which do not automatically lead 
to the total exclusion of representatives 
of the other communities.” For example, 
the lower parliamentary house, the House 
of Representatives, ensures representation 
of both of the state’s political territories, 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the Republika Srpska. The Constitu-
tion requires that two-thirds of the House 
of Representatives be selected from the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
while the other third be chosen from the 
Republika Srpska, regardless of ethnicity. 
Mandating regional representation rather 
than an ethnic quota may preserve peace 
between the entities without excluding 
non-constituent groups.
The effect of the Court’s decision 
remains to be seen. Debates on constitu-
tional reform began in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina in 2005, but have yielded no 
significant changes thus far. Most recently, 
in October 2009, U.S.-EU brokered talks 
in Butmir failed to produce meaningful 
agreement, casting uncertainty on the rul-
ing’s ability to instigate real change. Elec-
tions for the Presidency and House of 
Peoples will next be held in October 2010.
swiss Ban on minaRets HeaDs to 
euRoPean couRt
On December 16, 2009, Hafid Oua-
rdiri, an Algerian-born Muslim living in 
Switzerland and former spokesman for the 
Geneva Mosque, filed a complaint with 
the Court challenging Switzerland’s recent 
constitutional amendment barring the con-
struction of new mosque minarets. The ban, 
approved in a November 2009 referendum 
by 57.5 percent of the Swiss population 
and 22 of the state’s 26 cantons, will add a 
new Article 72(3) to the Swiss constitution, 
plainly stating, “The construction of mina-
rets is prohibited.” Ouardiri argues that the 
amendment violates Convention Article 9, 
the freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion; Article 13, the right to an effective 
remedy; and Article 14, the prohibition of 
discrimination.
The Swiss People’s Party, a conserva-
tive political party previously criticized 
for its racist campaigns, initially proposed 
the amendment with several other small 
groups in April 2007. Although recogniz-
ing that the Swiss constitution guarantees 
the freedom of religion, the website for 
the Federal Popular Initiative Against the 
Construction of Minarets argues that “the 
minaret is the symbol of a political-reli-
gious claim that . . . places religion above 
the State.” Because minarets represent 
respecting religion more than the laws of 
the state, these structures, according to the 
site, represent an “attempt . . . to impose 
a legal system based on sharia in Switzer-
land,” thus threatening the supremacy of 
the Swiss federal government.
The Swiss government opposed the 
initiative and urged citizens to reject it, yet 
stated that it will not overturn the amend-
ment. Micheline Calmy-Rey, the Federal 
Councilor of the Swiss Federal Department 
of Foreign Affairs admitted in an inter-
view with Le Monde that, although “the 
[Swiss] government and political parties 
were surprised by the result” of the referen-
dum, a government reversal is unlikely. To 
dismiss the referendum would be “to sup-
press participative democracy,” continues 
Calmy-Rey.
The Swiss government adamantly 
asserts that the minaret ban neither reflects 
anti-Islam sentiment nor impacts Muslims’ 
ability to practice their religion; however, 
the referendum fueled fears of an increas-
ingly hostile environment for Switzerland’s 
400,000 Muslims. Farhad Afshar, leader 
of the Coordination of Islamic Organiza-
tions in Switzerland, revealed to The New 
York Times that the “[m]ost painful for 
[Muslims] is not the minaret ban, but the 
symbol sent by this vote. Muslims do not 
feel accepted as a religious community.”
If accepted by the Court, this case 
would pose an interesting scenario. The 
Swiss government, which opposed the ini-
tiative, would serve as the party defending 
the vote. According to Ouardiri’s attorney 
Pierre de Preux, “We will have both the 
plaintiff Hafid Ouardiri and the defen-
dant, Switzerland, saying the same thing. 
The court is still free to decide whatever 
it wants, but it sure is going to help the 
request.”
The Court has yet to determine whether 
to admit the case. To present a case 
before the Court, the applicant must have 
exhausted all other available domestic judi-
cial remedies; however, the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal, Switzerland’s highest court, lacks 
jurisdiction over cases contesting refer-
enda. Even if the Court accepts the applica-
tion for a hearing, a decision is unlikely for 
several years.
Human tRafficking vioLates 
aRticLe 4
In a historic judgment, the Court held 
that human trafficking constitutes a viola-
tion of Article 4 of the Convention, the 
prohibition of slavery and forced labor. 
In its January 7, 2010 ruling in Rantsev v. 
Cyprus and Russia, the Court elaborated 
on the positive obligations of all states 
to combat human trafficking by adopt-
ing “appropriate” legal and administrative 
frameworks, taking preventative measures, 
and providing adequate investigations of 
known cases of trafficking.
The case centered on Oxana Rantseva, 
a Russian national, who entered Cyprus on 
an artiste visa, a visa commonly associ-
ated with commercial sexual exploitation. 
After she ran away from the cabaret where 
she worked, Rantseva’s employer brought 
her to the police to have her deported. Fol-
lowing a brief detainment, police decided 
against deportation and released Rantseva 
back to her employer. Hours later, Rant-
seva was found dead below the balcony 
of another employee’s apartment, a bed 
sheet tied to the railing above her. Never 
investigating the possibility that she was a 
human trafficking victim, perhaps trying 
to escape, the Cypriot government closed 
the case, declaring that the “strange cir-
cumstances” of Rantseva’s death suggested 
an accident. Despite Russia’s request for 
further investigation, Cyprus refused to 
reopen the case.
Although Cyprus admitted to violating 
several Convention articles, the Court pro-
ceeded to examine the case because of the 
serious nature of the allegations of traffick-
ing, ultimately finding violations of Article 
2, the right to life; Article 4, the prohibition 
of slavery and forced labor; and Article 5, 
the right to liberty and security. While not 
specifically equating human trafficking 
with slavery, the Court determined that it 
clearly fell within the scope of Article 4, 
because human trafficking “by its very 
nature and aim of exploitation, is based on 
the exercise of powers attaching to the right 
of ownership.” States therefore have a posi-
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tive duty to prevent trafficking and protect 
its victims. The Court found Cyprus vio-
lated Article 4 by failing to take proac-
tive measures to prevent and investigate 
the suspected trafficking. Russia violated 
Article 4 as well by failing to investigate 
Rantseva’s recruitment by traffickers.
Russian and Cypriot law criminalizes 
human trafficking, yet both states continue 
to have significant problems. The 2008 
U.S. Department of State Trafficking in 
Persons Report categorizes Russia and 
Cyprus as Tier 2 Watch List states. Country 
rankings, which range from Tier 1 to Tier 3, 
are based on the state’s status as a source, 
destination, or transit country and the gov-
ernment’s initiative and resources available 
to combat trafficking and accommodate 
victims. Russia, deemed a source, destina-
tion, and transit state, “has yet to provide 
comprehensive victim assistance,” accord-
ing to the report. Although Cyprus, pri-
marily a destination state, has taken some 
legislative initiative against trafficking, its 
failure to abolish the artiste visa, despite 
knowledge that the “the word ‘artiste’ . . . 
has become synonymous with ‘prostitute,’” 
has kept the country on the Watch List.
The Council of Europe has taken 
measures to combat trafficking amongst 
Member States, including adopting the 
Convention on Action against Traffick-
ing of Human Beings. Legally binding on 
States Parties, the Anti-Trafficking Con-
vention seeks to aid victims and establishes 
a monitoring mechanism to report the 
progress of domestic implementation and 
make specific policy recommendations 
to States Parties not in compliance. The 
Court’s ruling in Rantsev should render the 
Anti-Trafficking Convention more effec-
tive. Holding that the European Conven-
tion bans human trafficking, the rulings 
now require all member states, including 
those that have failed to sign or ratify the 
Anti-Trafficking Convention, to prevent 
trafficking and protect victims.
Whitney Hayes, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, covers the 
European Court of Human Rights for the 
Human Rights Brief.
inter-ameriCan SyStem
iactHR RefoRms RuLes of 
PRoceDuRe
On November 24, 2009, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR) presented its new rules of proce-
dure, describing the reform process as “the 
product of constructive, participatory, and 
transparent communication with the differ-
ent actors and users of the Inter-American 
System.” The Court received suggestions 
from the Inter-American Commission, 
several Member States, and various civil 
society organizations. The reform reflects 
a noteworthy effort to ensure procedural 
equality among parties, refocuses the 
Commission as a neutral organ within the 
Inter-American system, and recalibrates 
Court proceedings to be more efficient.
The new rules seek to ensure that 
the Commission acts as a neutral organ 
intended to guarantee procedural equality 
among parties in proceedings before the 
Court. Prior to the reform, the Commission 
initiated proceedings before the Court by 
submitting a limited application that only 
identified claims and parties to the case, 
set forth facts that gave rise to an alleged 
violation of the American Convention of 
Human Rights or the American Declara-
tion of the Rights and Duties of Man, 
listed evidence provided by the parties, 
and stated its conclusions. Additionally, the 
Commission was required to provide the 
Court with a copy of its Article 50 report. 
Such a report is prepared in compliance 
with Article 50 of the Convention and 
issued to a state containing conclusions, 
proposals, and recommendations that if 
complied with, would remedy alleged vio-
lations of the Convention or the Declara-
tion and would obviate any need for the 
Commission to initiate proceeding before 
the Court. In addition, the Commission 
was previously not required to forward to 
the Court the entire case file, including a 
copy of the State’s response to the Article 
50 report. In other words, the Commis-
sion’s report materials sent to the Court 
did not include actions the state may have 
taken to remedy alleged violation of the 
Convention or Declaration.
Under the new rules, the Commission 
must submit a merits report that includes 
all the information previously required plus 
its observations regarding the state’s answer 
to the Article 50 report recommendations 
and its reasons for submitting the case to 
the Court. The Commission’s report to the 
Court will now contain all documents in 
the case file, including all communications 
following the issue of the Article 50 report. 
The new rules therefore ensure the Com-
mission’s neutrality by requiring it to send 
all relevant information regarding the case, 
without selecting documents or informa-
tion that could be perceived as favoring one 
party over the other.
Similarly, the reform seeks to curtail the 
Commission’s function as an advocate for 
either party in the litigation. Previously, 
the Commission would offer witnesses 
and declarations which supported the vic-
tim’s claim, thereby assuming the role of 
the victim’s advocate. Now, the Commis-
sion will not offer witnesses to support a 
victim’s claim, and can only offer expert 
witnesses in limited circumstances. This 
change exemplifies the reform’s objective 
of defining the Commission as an organ 
that promotes respect for human rights in 
general, but does not act as a legal repre-
sentative to specific alleged victims.
The new rules also reinforce the Com-
mission’s neutral role before the Court by 
creating a mechanism that provides vic-
tims with neutral representation. Under the 
previous rules of procedure, the Commis-
sion represented those victims who lacked 
legal representation. Article 37 now allows 
the Court to appoint an “Inter-American 
Defender” to act as a legal representative 
for the victim throughout the proceed-
ings. Through this reform, victims will be 
guaranteed an attorney to represent them 
before the Court; economic considerations 
will no longer impede access to legal 
representation; and the Commission will 
be prevented from taking the conflicting 
roles of a victim’s legal representative and 
a neutral organ.
The new rules aim to make Court pro-
ceedings more efficient. For instance, 
Articles 28, 44, and 51(11) authorize the 
Court to use new technologies to expedite 
proceedings and facilitate communication 
between the Court, the Commission, the 
state, and the victims. Moreover, the new 
rules permit the Court to accept elec-
tronic briefs from all parties and receive 
statements through electronic audio-visual 
means.
Finally, Article 19 now prohibits judges 
from considering and deliberating in cases 
against states of which they are nationals, 
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limiting possible bias by the Court. Article 
25 now authorizes the representatives of 
alleged victims who do not agree on one 
“common intervener” in a case, to appoint 
up to three common interveners. A com-
mon intervener is the only person autho-
rized to present pleadings, motions, and 
evidence during the proceedings; in cases 
with multiple victims, agreeing on a single 
individual has proved difficult. In sum, 
these procedural reforms appear to reflect 
the different interests and concerns of par-
ties before the Court and will hopefully 
enhance procedural efficiency.
iactHR Denounces veneZueLa’s 
cRiminaLiZation of sPeecH against 
tHe goveRnment
On November 20, 2009, the Inter-Amer-
ican Court of Human Rights found Ven-
ezuela violated Francisco Usón Ramírez’s 
right to freedom of expression when it 
sentenced him to prison under a statute 
that criminalizes statements dishonoring 
the Venezuelan military. American Univer-
sity Washington College of Law’s Impact 
Litigation Project represented Usón before 
the Court.
In November 2004, a Venezuelan mili-
tary tribunal convicted Usón for “dishonor-
ing and disrespecting the [armed] forces of 
Venezuela,” as articulated in Section 505 of 
the penal code, after Usón spoke on tele-
vision about an incident in which prison 
guards at a military fort were alleged 
to have burned an inmate with a flame-
thrower. Usón suggested that, if the allega-
tions were true, the assault was probably 
premeditated by members of the military. 
The military judge held that Usón’s decla-
rations offended the honor of Venezuela’s 
armed forces and sentenced him to five and 
a half years in prison. Usón served three 
and a half years and was conditionally 
released on parole.
The IACtHR declared that section 505 
of the Venezuelan penal code, which crimi-
nalizes speech that dishonors the Ven-
ezuelan armed forces, violates Article 13, 
freedom of thought and expression, of 
the Convention. The Court explained that 
the right to freedom of expression is not 
absolute. Article 13(2) of the Convention 
provides that exercising the right may be 
subject to subsequent liability when limita-
tions to the right are “expressly established 
by law” (the legality requirement) and only 
restrict the right to “the extent necessary to 
ensure: (1) respect for the rights or repu-
tations of others; or (2) the protection of 
national security [and] public order,” (the 
necessary and proportional requirements). 
Venezuela argued that the limitations to 
freedom of expression created in Section 
505 were consistent with Article 13.2; the 
IACtHR found otherwise.
The Court noted that Section 505 was 
too vague and ambiguous to meet the 
legality requirement of Article 13.2. Spe-
cifically, the statute did not strictly pre-
scribe the elements constituting an injury 
to the honor of the armed forces, nor 
did it specify the mens rea requirement. 
Moreover, the IACtHR held that while the 
state’s interest in protecting the honor of 
the armed forces was a legitimate aim that 
could justify restricting freedom of expres-
sion, the criminal sanctions prescribed 
in Section 505 were excessively vague 
and ambiguous, and therefore incompatible 
with the Amercian Convention. Finally, 
the IACtHR found that the limitation on 
speech was disproportional, balancing the 
government’s interest in protecting the 
honor of the military with Usón’s right to 
comment on a matter of public importance. 
In a carefully parsed-out conclusion, the 
IACtHR criticized the state, holding that 
it gave “greater and automatic protection 
to the honor and reputation [of the armed 
forces] without considering the heightened 
protection accorded to freedom of expres-
sion within a democratic society.”
The Court also declared that Venezu-
ela violated Usón’s rights under Article 
8 (right to fair trial) and Article 25 (right 
to judicial protection) of the Convention 
because Usón was tried in a military court, 
although he was not an active military 
officer nor had he committed a crime of 
military nature. The Court ordered the state 
to annul Usón’s trial and clear his criminal 
record, and also ordered reparations.
The Usón case is best understood within 
Inter-American jurisprudence related to 
desacato or contempt laws, which crimi-
nalize speech against the government or 
public officials. For example, in Kimel 
v. Argentina the IACtHR found that the 
state’s criminal definition of defamation 
could not be extended to protect the gov-
ernment’s honor. Also, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights has stated 
that desacato laws are inconsistent with 
democracy because they provide greater 
protection to public officials than to pri-
vate citizens and in democratic societies 
the government should be subject to public 
scrutiny.
Although the IACtHR found that Ven-
ezuela violated Usón’s right to freedom 
of expression, the decision could have 
gone further by spelling out two impor-
tant points. First, the Court could have 
rejected the notion that the government 
has a permissible interest in protecting the 
honor and reputation of an institution like 
the armed forces. Instead, the Court found 
that Venezuela’s interest in protecting the 
military’s honor was a legitimate aim that 
may justify imposing subsequent liability 
on freedom of expression. This finding is 
problematic because an abusive state could 
promulgate contempt laws and limit dis-
sent or critical speech with the justification 
that these laws aim to protect government 
honor.
Second, the Court could have ruled that 
the state may never use its criminal law to 
protect the military’s honor. As a result, it 
left open the possibility that the state could 
amend its laws to be compatible with the 
Convention and then use it against citizens 
to protect the military’s honor. To its credit, 
however, the Court did create an extremely 
high threshold for imposing criminal liabil-
ity to protect the government’s right to 
honor.   HRB
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